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The Nov. 2005 Rudolf B. Schlesinger Lecture
on International and Comparative Law

Lawless World? The Bush
Administration and Iraq: Issues of
International Legality and Criminality
By PROFESSOR PHILIPPE SANDS QC*

Dean, Professor, students, I feel greatly privileged to have been
invited to speak this afternoon on the subject of America's
engagement with international law. I will focus on issues of legality
and criminality arising in the context of the war in Iraq.
When I was invited to give this lecture, issues of legality and Iraq
were very much in the air in Britain. The May 2005 General Election
was dominated by Iraq, and in particular the circumstances in which
the British Prime Minister took Britain to war. My book, Lawless
World, was published shortly before the election, and describes the
way in which the British Government misled Parliament and the
public on the intelligence relating to weapons of mass destruction,
issues of legality, and publication of the Attorney General's advice.
The revised and extended U.S. edition of my book was published
in this country last week. The publishers could not have timed it
better. Last Friday, Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald announced
five indictments against Lewis Libby, the Vice President's Chief of
* Schlesinger Lecturer November 2005, Professor of Law at University College
London and a barrister at Matrix Chambers. I would like to thank Professor Joel
Paul very warmly for his generosity in providing a platform for this lecture, and also
the Dean of the Law School and faculty colleagues for their hospitality on this and
other occasions. I am also grateful to Andy Green, Simon Goodfellow, Kristin
Cornuelle, Jessica Fourneret and all the staff of the Hastings International and
Comparative Law Review for their efforts in supporting the lecture and its
publication.
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Staff. The circumstances touch directly on the circumstances in which
President Bush took this country to war, and the reasonableness of
his Administration's belief that Saddam Hussein's Iraq had weapons
of mass destruction. The door is now open to a comprehensive
examination of that issue.
Aside from the issue of the naming of Valerie Plame, I believe
that the road to war in Iraq is one that is tainted with international
illegality. The conduct of the so-called - and in my view wholly
misconceived - "war on terror" has caused the Bush Administration
to abandon the rules of international law. It has done so deliberately
and systematically. It has done so in its efforts to create a legal black
hole at Guantanamo and to deny the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war to Taliban and AlQaeda detainees. It has done so in a deliberate policy of detainee
interrogations that has sought to avoid the constraints of the 1984
Convention on the Prohibition of Torture. It has done so in waging
an illegal war against Iraq which was not authorized by the U.N.
Security Council and was not justified - or even claimed to be
justified - as self-defense. And it has done so in its failure to meet its
international obligations in pursuing a policy of extraordinary
rendition from Iraq and elsewhere.
All of this is distinctly un-American. Facing a real threat, the
systematic dismemberment of international rules has undermined the
morale of American troops and others involved in promoting
American security, undermined relations with allies and friends, and
exposed a great number of individuals to criminal liability. How has
this happened, and what is to be done?
Before turning to those issues, let me provide some background.
This story begins in August 1941, on a warship off the coast of
Newfoundland, at a meeting between U.S. President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. It is
a time of great challenge for Britain and the United States, yet these
two men decide that what they need to do is draw up a blueprint for
the new international order once the Nazis have been vanquished.
What is needed is a new, rules-based system to replace the thenexisting arrangements that allowed a state to do whatever was not
expressly prohibited by international law. And since not much was
prohibited, there was a great deal states could do. They could wage
war without restriction. They could commit genocide against their
own populations. They could torture detainees. That was the world
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of the 1930s.
Roosevelt and Churchill set out to change that. They drafted a
one-page document - the Atlantic Charter - by which they intended
to make known, as they put it, "certain common principles in the
national policies of their respective countries on which they base their
hopes for a better future for the world."' The Atlantic Charter was
short and visionary and identified eight principles, revolving around
three key pillars reflected in the U.N. Charter: a general obligation on
states to refrain from the use of force, except in self-defense or where
the U.N. Security Council or a regional body has authorized them to
use force; a commitment to human rights, to maintain the "inherent
dignity" and the "equal and inalienable rights" of all members of the
human family; and an undertaking to promote economic
liberalization through the adoption of free trade rules and related
international obligations in the fields of foreign investment and
intellectual property.
These are the three pillars that have remained in place for the
last sixty years. Overarching them was a commitment to the
Roosevelt and Churchill committed
international rule of law.
themselves to recasting the eight principles of the Atlantic Charter
into binding legal instruments. And this they did, with later
assistance from Truman and Attlee. In a remarkable period between
1941 and 1949, the modern system of international law was put in
place through a series of far-reaching treaties which have now
received very broad acceptance. In the spring of 1945, fifty-one states
agreed on the creation of the United Nations at San Francisco,
crystallizing in law the modern rules governing the use of force and
promoting human rights. That was followed by the U.N. General
Assembly's Universal Declaration of Human Rights - Eleanor
Roosevelt's baby - which in turn led to the covenants on civil and
political rights and on economic and social rights, to regional treaties
like the European Convention on Human Rights, and to the Human
Rights Act of 1998, a singular achievement of the Prime Minister's
first government.
The day after the Universal Declaration was adopted, the
General Assembly agreed on the world's first human rights treaty, the
1948 Convention on the Prohibition of Genocide. It was followed by
other specialized human rights treaties, such as the 1984 Torture
1. Atlantic Charter, Aug. 14, 1941, U.S.-U.K., reproduced in PHILIPPE SANDS,
LAWLESS WORLD 257-58 (2005).
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Convention, which obliged its parties to prosecute or extradite
torturers and which did away with Senator Pinochet's right to claim
immunity before the English courts (also in 1998, it turns out that was
a big year for international law). By then also the Allies had agreed
on other new rules to stop individuals doing nasty things in the name
of the state: the Statute of the Nuremburg Military Tribunal gave
birth to a new field of international criminal law. This would
eventually lead to the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals and then (also
in 1998) to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
And in the same post-war period, the United States and Britain led
international efforts to negotiate the four Geneva Conventions on the
law of armed conflict, including Geneva Convention 3 on the
treatment of prisoners of war. This is the same instrument that was to
become the center of so much attention in relation to events at
Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Abu Ghraib.
Developments in international law were no less far-reaching in
the economic field: the Bretton Woods Agreement created the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1944. And in 1948,
agreement was reached on the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade - the GATT - the world's first global free trade rules and the
parent of today's World Trade Organization, the WTO.
By any standard, these were remarkable achievements in a very
short period of time.
The new rules-based system initiated by the Atlantic Charter was
not altruism at play. It reflected a view that international rules would
promote Anglo-American interests, serve as a bulwark against the
Soviet model, and emphasize values to be marshalled against Nazi
and fascist threats. But the simple point is that international rules
were seen as creating opportunities, not imposing constraints. The
Atlantic Charter had an immediate and far-reaching impact. Writing
in his autobiography, Nelson Mandela describes the Atlantic Charter
as reaffirming his faith in human dignity: "some in the west saw the
Charter as empty promises," he wrote, "but not those of us in Africa.
Inspired by the Atlantic Charter and the fight of the Allies against
tyranny and aggression, the ANC created its own charter.., which
called for full citizenship for all Africans, the right to buy land and the
repeal of all discriminating legislation." 2
Over the next sixty years, the principles set forth in the Atlantic

2.

SANDS,

supra note 1, at 9.
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Charter defined a new international order. A great number of
international agreements have been adopted since then, touching on
issues that affect each and every one of us very directly. Trade.
Investment. Commerce. Air transport. Oceans. Boundaries.
Human rights.
The great majority of these rules are not
controversial. They work efficiently and well. They establish the
minimum standards necessary for cooperation in an increasingly
interdependent world. The emergence of this great body of rules
reflects a silent global revolution, and most people are blissfully
unaware quite how much international law there is. This does raise
serious issues about accountability and legitimacy in international
law-making - it is a matter of real concern that, in the United
Kingdom, treaties are generally not debated by Parliament unless
they address an issue of E.C. law. By all accounts, there was no
parliamentary debate about the WTO agreements. But that is for
another time, and not this evening.
Nor would I wish to leave you with the impression that I am
starry-eyed about international rules, to suggest that global rules can
sort out all the wrongs of the world. Plainly they cannot. Events over
the last sixty years demonstrate that. There are a great number of
rules which require attention.
And certainly the world has changed greatly in the period since
the United Nations was created. The number of states has grown
from around fifty to around 200, a result of decolonization. The
range of issues requiring international cooperation - and hence
international legislation - has also grown, to include issues like the
environment, tourism, and consumer safety. New international actors
have emerged: the monopoly of states has diminished and
international organizations, NGOs, corporations, and individuals are
demanding a role in ways that present profound challenges for an
international legal order constructed on the assumption that the
global order revolved around states alone. Failed states, peripatetic
travellers, permeable national borders, maligned non-governmental
actors like Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, are but some of the issues that pose
very real challenges to the established international legal order. Do
they require us to revisit the basis of the post World War II legal
settlement? President Bush has made the argument, so has the Prime
Minister, most recently at a speech he gave in Sedgefield in March
2004, which some have seen as an endorsement of Bush's call for a
right to pre-emptive strike.

300
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Are the existing rules adequate? That question has been asked
with increasing frequency since 9/11. It is said by some that the
international legal order is no longer up to the task it was designed to
address in the period after WWII, in the face of current challenges. It
is said that the rules governing terrorism, wars and rogue states are
inadequate. And it is said that the international rules threaten
American security and sovereignty.
To be sure, those who make this claim most frequently and
loudly are often associated with the neo-conservative elements that
dominated the agenda of George W. Bush's first Administration. In
the months before 9/11, it was clear that the Bush Administration was
committed to remaking the international rules, to limiting or killing
off the rules that were seen to be too constraining. Many members of
this group had been in office in the first Bush Presidency, and they
regrouped during the Clinton Administration. Plans were set out in
various manifestos. I commend to you in particular the Statement of
Principles of the Project for a New American Century, to get a flavor
of what was being proposed in the late 1990s (although you may also
want to take a look at www.bushcountry.org). Tapping on a rich vein
of American exceptionalism, the key targets include international law
and the rules which had allowed the detention of Senator Pinochet,
the Statute of the new International Criminal Court, the Kyoto
Protocol on global warming (1997), and various arms control treaties.
Each of these treaties would, it was argued, constrain America,
undermine sovereignty, and threaten U.S. national security.
Within weeks of taking office in January 2001, President Bush
had set a new agenda: Kyoto and the ICC statute was "unsigned," a
protocol on biological weapons scuppered, and a new policy of "a la
carte multilateralism" put in place: you pick and choose the bits of
international law you like and get rid of the rest. John Bolton was
appointed as one of President Bush's senior foreign policy advisers as
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the
U.S. Department of State. He would oversee Iran's compliance with
its nuclear obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is the
same John Bolton who had, a little earlier, declared that treaties were
only political and "not legally binding." And very early on, a small
group of neo-con lawyers were parachuted into key positions at the
U.S. Justice Department and the Pentagon. Although their views
were not widely shared, particularly among career civil servants and
the military, they would come to dominate decision-making.
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The point I make is a simple one: even before 9/11 the conditions
were in place for an assault on Roosevelt's vision of international
order based on new rules. From this perspective, 9/11 presented a
terrific opportunity to promote the "anti-international law" project.
Little time was lost. Within days of the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, lawyers in the Bush Administration had
been charged with putting in place the new legal rules which were
necessary to prosecute the response. On the key legal issues, there
was no consultation with allies, not even Britain.
An early decision was taken to characterize the response to AlQaeda and international terrorism as a "war on terrorism." This had
the effect of taking it outside the scope of the ordinary criminal law
and into the rules of armed conflict. But these rules placed limits on
what you could do to detainees. POWs could not be questioned.
Acting unilaterally in a manner that was wholly inconsistent with the
requirements of the Geneva Conventions, the Administration
determined that individual detainees would be placed outside the
constraints of the law. The Guantanamo detention facility on land
leased from Cuba was chosen because Administration lawyers had
advised that its location outside U.S. territory would provide a means
of redress under U.S. constitutional law and international law.
Guantanamo was created as a "legal black hole," as the English Court
of Appeal later described it.
It is striking that those lawyers in the Administration who
conjured up this scheme were conscious that international rules
placed constraints on what could be done, not least in relation to
conditions of detention and interrogation. The legal advices that
have come into the public domain recognize the existence of the
international rules but not their well-established consequences. The
country that had done more than any other to put in place a new
rules-based system was using 9/11 to ditch some of those rules.
International law was now part of the problem, not the solution. 2002
was not a good year for international law, although quite how bad it
was did not become clear until much later, when the legal advice
started leaking out into the public domain.
The neo-con lawyers who ventured to speak publicly did not pull
their punches. White House General Counsel Alberto Gonzales
determined that the Geneva Convention on the treatment of POWs
simply did not apply to Al-Qaeda or the Taliban because their
members were unlawful combatants. The ICRC - guardian of the
The
rules - has consistently refused to accept this claim.
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Administration's view is novel and ditches past U.S. practice,
generating a sharp response from U.S. military lawyers who saw
straight away that abandoning the rules would leave the U.S. military
highly exposed. The new U.S. view was based on the belief that
international terrorism had created a new paradigm. Gonzales
famously declared that this new paradigm "renders obsolete Geneva's
strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders
quaint some of its provisions., 3 Over at the Justice Department, Jay
Bybee, a political appointee as Assistant Attorney General, was
asked to advise on the standards of conduct required by the 1984
Convention against Torture, as implemented by U.S. federal law. His
memorandum of October 1, 2002, is probably the very worst piece of
legal advice (if it can be called that) that I have ever seen. It was
apparently prompted by CIA questions about what to do with
captives alleged to be top-ranking Al-Qaeda terrorists who had
turned "uncooperative." Dispensing with all known canons of treaty
interpretation, Mr. Bybee concluded that the concept of "torture"
covers only the most extreme acts, limited to severe pain which is
difficult for the victim to endure: "Where the pain is physical," he
writes in his legal memorandum, "it must be of an intensity akin to
that which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ
failure." Anything less will not be torture. It is therefore allowed.
Where the pain is mental, then it "requires suffering not just at the
moment of infliction but it also requires lasting psychological harm,
such as seen in mental disorders like post-traumatic stress disorder.' '4
There is no support whatsoever in international law for such an
interpretation. John Yoo was a U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney
General to Attorney General John Ashcroft, charged with advising
on the effect of rules such as the Geneva Conventions, the 1984
Convention Prohibiting Torture, and the ICC Statute. He could not
have been clearer in May 2002: "What the Administration is trying to
do is create a new legal regime."'
Indeed. But it was doing so unilaterally, without consultation,
and without regard to what the treaties required. It goes against the
very essence of the collective, rules-based arrangements that the
United States and Britain wanted to put in place in the 1940s. The
period between 9/11 and the summer of 2004 will, I expect, come to
3. SANDS, supra note 1, at 154.
4. Id. at 214.
5. Id. at 153.
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be seen as a low-point for America's engagement with international
law. Within the United States, the media went to sleep; so did the
Democrats; so did most international lawyers. Anyone who was
willing to speak out could not find a platform. Anyone within
Government - and there were many - who tried to speak up for the
established rules was overridden. The argument that the rules served
American interests got short shrift.
Against that background, the President also decided very early
on to get rid of Saddam Hussein.
The indictment of Scooter Libby opens the door to a proper
examination of the road to war in Iraq. That is timely. For the past
three years, the Bush Administration has been skittish about what it
really knew about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction. Joseph
Wilson undermined the credibility of the claim that Saddam had
sought to obtain uranium from Niger. He had to be dealt with to
leave intact the Bush Administration's claim that it acted reasonably
in taking the nation to war in Iraq. That claim's collapse would leave
the Administration badly exposed in countering a rising fear: that the
war was an internationally illegal error of historic proportions that
has made America look feeble and vulnerable, created new hunting
grounds for Al-Qaeda, and made the world an even more dangerous
place.
With time, the details will be fleshed out. But enough has
already emerged from insider accounts and from leaked documents to
allow a clear image. Within days of 9/11, President Bush had been
persuaded to address Iraq as part of a military response to the attacks
on America, even if no credible information pointed to any Iraqi link.
America needed to be seen to act decisively, and evidence-based
decisions went out of the window. The legitimacy of force required
an ally or two, since there was never any real probability that the
United States would actually go it alone. Tony Blair was convenient,
and he was amenable. By April 2002, he had been persuaded to join
in without even extracting much of a price. In the summer of 2002,
evidence of Iraqi WMD was "thin," as the "Downing Street Memo"
confirmed, and the facts were being fixed around the policy of
removing Saddam. Blair's price? As the war could not be sold as
regime change (plainly illegal under international law) it would have
to be justified on the grounds of the threat posed by Saddam's
possession of WMD.
The autumn of 2002 was dedicated to proving the WMD case,
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and to getting a green light from the United Nations Security Council.
No smoking gun was found. The Security Council adopted resolution
1441, which left ambiguous the question of whether a further Security
Council resolution was needed. But 1441 at least confirmed that war
would be arguable if it could be shown that Iraq was in material
breach of its disarmament obligation.
U.N. inspectors were
dispatched to Iraq. January 2003 was a difficult month. Colin Powell
told Jack Straw, his British counterpart, that if the case was too weak
for a second resolution then there would be no justification for the
United States to act unilaterally. George W. Bush and Tony Blair
worried that Hans Blix would not find a smoking gun, or worse still
might even report that Saddam was cooperating. The two leaders
discussed ways of provoking a "material breach" by Saddam. Bush
told Blair he would use force without a further resolution. The
starting date for the war was "penciled in" for March 10th.
Matters did not improve in February 2003. No smoking gun
emerged. Colin Powell's Security Council presentation bombed. The
Niger uranium claim was disputed. Blix reported greater Iraqi
cooperation. The lesser members of the Security Council proved to
be too independent, and could not be bought or budged. And,
contrary to claims that now seek to rewrite history, contemporaneous
accounts of individuals who had seen the intelligence disputed the
claim that Saddam had - or was about to get - WMD. The skeptical
reader need look no further than the resignation speech made in the
House of Commons on March 18, 2003, by British Cabinet Minister
Robin Cook, for a devastating rebuttal of the case based on WMD.
We now know that the decision to go to war was taken on the
false claim that Saddam had WMD. It has been established beyond
any reasonable doubt that there were no WMD. All that is left to the
Bush Administration is the plaintive claim that its belief that Saddam
had WMD was a reasonable one. With that claim punctured, the
whole house of cards collapses. Hence the significance of Joseph
Wilson, and why he had to be dealt with. Hence the significance of
establishing the role played by the White House in undermining Mr.
Wilson, his independence, and his credibility.
It will be said that the indictment focuses on points of legal
detail, not on substantive issues. But it does so against a background
of this bigger picture. That is why they are of great significance to an
audience that extends well beyond the United States. That audience
is looking to the United States for a credible strategy to extricate
Iraq, the region, and the world from the mess that is now unfolding.
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That requires less hauteur and hubris, more honesty, and more
cooperation with other nations. We face a real threat from forces that
seek to destabilize America and who will benefit from a long-term
Iraqi quagmire that makes America less likely to act when real
threats exist. Let us not gloat but rather hope that the indictment
allows the Administration a moment of reflection, and permit the
nation to return to reason, decency, and lawfulness in its foreign
policy decision-making.
In the United States, the tide of media and public interest only
began to turn in the spring of 2004, after a diligent group of
journalists uncovered pictures of abuse at Abu Ghraib. With those
discoveries, there emerged into daylight a series of legal opinions including the Bybee memorandum - which showed how far some of
the lawyers in the Administration - at the very highest levels - were
willing to go to override U.S. and international rules. A quiescent
Congress began a series of hearings, grilling Paul Wolfowitz, who
after much dissembling accepted that putting a bag over someone's
head for seventy-two hours was not humane. And later on that
summer the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in to open the door to legal
rights for the detainees at Guantanamo. Gunatanamo Bay was, wrote
Justice Scalia, "a foolish place to have housed alien wartime
detainees."
By the autumn of 2004, it had become apparent that ignoring
international law was not a cost-free exercise. U.S. authority had
been undermined. Other States were beginning to rely on U.S.
arguments. Is the damage irreversible?
Allow me to park that question for a moment, and say something
about the effect on Britain of new American thinking on international
law. In a certain sense there is a direct line linking the new American
approach to international law and Reg Keys' speech at Sedgefield last
week. I say this because it now appears that it was American legal
arguments that helped to convince the Attorney General to conclude
that a reasonable case could be made to proceed to war in Iraq
without an explicit resolution by the Security Council.
Whereas the U.S. media was largely silent about international
legal issues in the period between 9/11 and the summer of 2004, the
British media had given a great deal of attention to international law
issues. As early as January 2002 - as soon as it was known that a
number of the Guantanamo detainees were British nationals - media
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attention focused on the interplay of rights under the Geneva
Conventions and human rights law. Further attention was generated
by the Abbassi case brought by some of the British detainees to the
English courts, challenging the failure of the British Government to
take sufficient steps to ensure that the United States respected the
detainees' rights under international law. The English Court of
Appeal rejected the Government's argument that these issues were
not justiciable. Although the Court was not willing to order the
British Government to take any particular steps, its invocation of
international law and criticism of the U.S. actions were direct and
unambiguous:
What appears to us objectionable is that Mr. Abbassi should be
subject to indefinite detention in territory over which the United
States has exclusive control with no opportunity to challenge the
legitimacy of his detention before any court or tribunal.'
The Court concluded that Mr. Abbassi was being detained
arbitrarily in a "legal black hole" in breach of fundamental human
rights and basic principles recognized in English law and international
law. The judgment added to political pressure. It reaffirmed the
central importance of international law. And it gave a green light to
those who considered that the British Government should be held to
account by reference to the very standards of international law which
it had done so much to put in place. Two years later, of course, the
House of Lords gave judgment on the Government's derogation from
the Human Rights Act, adopted shortly after 9/11. The United
Kingdom was the only one of forty-four Council of Europe members
to enter a derogation, a matter for which it has been criticized in some
quarters. But at least it did so, unlike the United States, which simply
ignored the requirement of the Inter-American Convention on
Human Rights and the ICCPR in relation to Guantanamo, and did
not bother putting in a derogation. In the Belmarsh case, the Law
Lords relied on a number of principles of international law in ruling
that the indefinite detention without charge of non-U.K. nationals at
Belmarsh was discriminatory and unlawful.
The judicial decision in the Guantanamo and Belmarsh cases
signalled the courts' commitment to ensure that Britain respected its
international obligations. They also reflected a rejection of the fact
that AI-Qaeda and 9/11 had given rise to a new paradigm. And they

6. Id. at 166.
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indicated a high level of interest by the media in international law
issues. Even as political debate was raging over the treatment of
detainees at Guantanamo and Belmarsh, the Prime Minister was
grappling with the hurdles that international law had put before his
objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power. A great deal of
material is now in the public domain. No doubt more will come. The
picture that emerges indicates that from the earliest days after 9/11,
the planning for the war was focused on the very issues of
international law that became so central in the closing days of the
election campaign. Interest in the international law issues was not,
however, universal. Elements across the political spectrum joined in
declaiming the chattering classes' obsession with the niceties of
international law. An editorial in the Sunday Telegraph did not
mince words: "the 'legality' or otherwise of the war is a nonsubject... the whole of the issue 'international legality' is a gigantic
irrelevance." 7 And at the other end of the spectrum, in the Observer,
David Aaronovitch in a commendable critique of my book, Lawless
World, argued that I was focusing on the wrong question: "We should
not ask whether the Iraq invasion was 'legal' - we should ask whether
it was 'good."' 8 What is clear is that issues of legality in relation to
Iraq have catalyzed a debate on the proper function of international
law. That cannot be a bad thing.
The British Government did not adopt the position that
international law was irrelevant in deciding whether to go to war. In
the United States, the general view was that if war was legal under the
U.S. Constitution then that was good enough. "International law? ...
I don't know what you're talking about by international law,"
President Bush said in December 2003. From the earliest days,
however, the British Prime Minister was plainly concerned to ensure
that any actions taken against Iraq would have to be consistent with
the United Kingdom's international obligations.
It is now clear that as early as March 2002 the Prime Minister had
committed himself to support President Bush's military adventure.
On the 18th of that month, Sir David Manning, Blair's foreign policy
adviser, had written to the Prime Minister confirming that he had told
Condoleeza Rice: "you would not budge in your support for regime
change." The minutes of a key meeting chaired by the Prime
7. Editorial, A Legal Fiction, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

(LONDON),

Feb. 29, 2004, at

24.
8. David Aaronovitch, A War of Words, THE OBSERVER, Mar. 6, 2005, at 25.
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Minister on July 23, 2002 - published for the first time in full by the
Sunday Times two weeks ago - reports the PM as saying: "If the
political context were right, people would support regime change."9
The document will make it difficult to counter the claim that regime
change was the object.
However, the individuals at the meeting of July 23, 2002, were
told by the Attorney General that "the desire for regime change was
not a legal base for military action." He added that self-defense and
humanitarian intervention - the use of force to stop a massive and
systematic violation of fundamental rights - "could not be the base in
this case."" ° On established principles of international law, that left
just one possible option: to argue that war was authorized by the U.N.
Security Council. The minutes recording the July 2002 meeting
concluded with the following statement: "We must not ignore the
legal issues [.... ]" And it added: "the Attorney-General would
consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers." That was July
2002. The process of consideration took nearly nine months, with
many twists and turns.
The impending legal difficulties had already been spotted:
amongst the papers before the participants at the meeting on July 23,
2002 - who included the Defense Secretary, Foreign Secretary,
Attorney General, Sally Morgan, and Alastair Campbell - was a legal
memorandum which had been prepared by the Foreign Office
lawyers three months earlier, in March 2002. This identified the one
possible justification in international law for using force against Iraq.
In January 1991, Security Council resolution 678 had authorized the
use of force against Saddam, to get his forces out of Kuwait. A few
weeks later, with that objective achieved, resolution 687 suspended
the authorization to use force, and the Security Council imposed a
cease-fire. By resolution 687, the Security Council also imposed on
Iraq an obligation to disarm. The Foreign Office memorandum of
March 2002 raised the possibility that the authorization to use force
under resolution 678 could "revive" if Saddam's Iraq was determined
to be in material breach of its disarmament obligations under
resolution 687. Assuming the authorization to use force could
"revive," the key question was: who decides that Iraq is in material

9. Memorandum from Matthew Rycroft to David Manning, July 23, 2002,
reproduced in The Secret Downing Street Memo, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), May 1,
2005, at New 7.
10. Id.
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breach so as to allow the original authorization to revive? Is material
breach to be determined by the Security Council? Or, if the Council
fails to act, or chooses not to act, can one or more states determine
the existence of a material breach by Iraq? The question goes to the
heart of the international legal order: is decision-making collective, or
can states act unilaterally?
The Foreign Office memorandum was crystal clear in its
conclusion: "In the UK's view... it is for the Council to assess
whether any such breach of [the Security Council] obligations has
occurred." And it went on: "The US has a rather different view: they
maintain that assessment of breach is for individual member States.
We are not aware of any other state which supports this view."
Against that background, in November 2002, the Security
Council adopted the now famous resolution 1441. This gave Saddam
Hussein a final opportunity to meet his disarmament obligations
under resolution 687. It sent the U.N. inspectors back to Iraq, under
the direction of Hans Blix. But it left open the question of what
precisely would happen once Mr. Blix had reported. There were two
views. Under one view - adhered to by the great majority of states a further Security Council resolution would be required to determine
that Saddam was in material breach of his obligations under 1441 and
to authorize force. Under another view - the minority view - the
Security Council was only required to discuss the issue, so that U.N.
members would be free to decide for themselves whether a material
breach had occurred so as to justify the use of force.
Even after 1441, the Foreign Office lawyers agreed that a second
and explicit Security Council resolution was needed. 1441 was not
enough. The Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, disagreed. The matter
went to the Attorney General. For reasons that are not clear, he did
not give the Prime Minister his advice until March 7, 2003, even
though the Ministerial Code of Conduct requires that the Attorney
General be consulted "in good time before the Government is
committed to critical decisions involving legal considerations." Why
the advice was left until so late is not known, although some suspect
that the Prime Minister would have known that early advice may not
have been entirely helpful. In any event, the passage of time allowed
the Attorney General to make an important trip to Washington, in
February 2003, to ascertain the views of that country's legal advisers.
The fact that such a trip was made is interesting. I have been asked
whether he also made trips to Beijing or Moscow or Paris, and if not,
why not. In any event, the trip to the United States seems to have had
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a certain effect. The advice of March 7th makes a number of
references to the views of the U.S. Administration, and also to "the
strength and sincerity" of those views. On the crucial issue - whether
resolution 1441 can revive the authorization in 678 without a further
resolution - the Attorney General accepts that a reasonable case can
be made "having regard to... the arguments of the U.S.
Administration which I heard in Washington."
The advice of March 7th is the only formal written advice
produced by the Attorney General. It runs to thirteen pages. It was
sent to the Prime Minister, and then passed on to the Foreign
Secretary and Defense Secretary. It was not shown to the Cabinet.
That too is curious, and apparently inconsistent with the Ministerial
Code of Conduct. What the Cabinet was given instead - on the
morning of March 17, 2003, just three days before the war began was a much shorter document of just 337 words. That is the
document that was published later that same day by the Attorney
General as an answer to a parliamentary question.
It is the differences between the two documents - the advice of
March 7th and the answer to the parliamentary question of March
17th - that raise serious questions, questions which have not yet been
answered.
The March 7th advice was highly equivocal. It accepts that in
principle the authorization to use force under 678 could revive, but
concludes that a lawful war without explicit Security Council
authorization would be no more than "reasonably arguable." And
that "reasonably arguable" case would only be sustainable "if there
are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to take
the final opportunity." The advice is certainly not a green light for
war: as the Attorney General put it "a 'reasonable case' does not
mean that if the matter ever came before a court I would be confident
that the court would agree with the view." Those words speak very
powerfully.
I do not share even that equivocal conclusion, and I do not know
of many outside the United States who do. I have always thought
that the war was illegal. Resolution 678 was limited to removing
Saddam's forces from Kuwait. It was never considered to be a basis
for his overthrow. That was the view of Colin Powell and John
Major. Putting it at its simplest, the dominant view amongst states
and international lawyers is that since the ceasefire was adopted by
the Security Council then it must be for the Security Council to bring
the cease-fire to an end. It is a view with which the Attorney General
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appears (in an introductory part of his March 7th advice) to agree:
adopting the language of the Foreign Office he says early on his
advice that "I am not aware of any other state" which supports the
U.S. view that the assessment of an Iraqi breach is a matter for
individual states. Yet later, in his summary, he appears to reach a
different view, through a process of reasoning which seems to be not
entirely clear. The conclusion is problematic, not least because it
seems to signal the death of collective security and will make Security
Council members far more wary in the future. I find it difficult to
imagine that the Attorney General would necessarily have come to
the same conclusion if he had been asked a different question: could
Turkey or Iran decide that on their own that Saddam was in breach of
his obligations and then decide unilaterally to use force?
So why does all this matter, and where does it leave us and
international law, for now and for the future? It is time to move on,
many will say.
The events of the last three years matter, first and foremost,
because they have significant consequences for international
governance. We live in a complex, interdependent world in which
social, political, economic, and religious values and interests collide
with increasing frequency over an ever greater set of issues.
International law sets minimum standards of behavior. Outside of
bullying and force it is all we have to provide a framework for
resolving those differences. Without international law we are back to
the law of the jungle, the very world which Roosevelt and Churchill
committed to change when they met off the coast of Newfoundland in
August 1941. I want Britain and the United States batting for
international law, not against it.
There will be occasions where the international rules are wholly
inadequate, occasions when states may justifiably feel the need to
dispense with the rules and go it alone. 9/11 and the threat posed by
Al-Qaeda is not, for the time being at least, such an occasion. Nor
was the situation in Iraq in March 2003 such an occasion. The rules
set forth in the Geneva Convention, in human rights treaties and in
the U.N. Charter in relation to the use of force did not need the
treatment they have received.
It is dangerous indeed to begin to imagine a system of
international governance in which some states - the large and
powerful ones - feel that they can pick and choose the international
rules they like and discard those which they don't. Yet that has been
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the approach adopted by the Bush Administration, reflected in the
notion of a la carte multilateralism. And it is an approach for which
the British Government has provided some support, maintaining a
public silence on the excesses of Guantanamo and buying into a legal
argument for war in Iraq which was denuded of any international
support.
The approach degrades international law, and it makes it more
difficult to rely on rules when others violate them. If you begin to
tinker unilaterally with the international rules you don't like - on
human rights, on the Geneva Conventions, on the use of force - then
others may be begin to tinker with the rules they don't like - on trade,
on intellectual property, on the rights of foreign investors. If you
send out a message that you consider the rules to be obsolete and
incapable of meeting new paradigms, you prevent yourself from
challenging others who then act in the same way. That is a serious
problem right now in many areas, for example, nuclear proliferation.
Imagine how easy it is for those in Tehran to respond to allegations
from the United States and Britain that they are not complying with
the requirements of the NPT.
The British and American Governments would do well to bear in
mind the words of George Kennan, the great American diplomat
(and not known for a strong attachment to international rules), in his
famous telegram from Moscow in 1947, anonymously signed X. He
ended his warning of the Soviet threat with these words: "[W]e must
have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and
conceptions of human society. [T]he greatest danger that can befall
us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall
allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping."
This brings me to my concluding remarks. It may be thought,
listening to me this evening, that you might divine that I would be
pessimistic about what is to come, and the future of international law.
But I do not feel that way. Why not? Because the rules of
international law which have been the subject of so unremitting an
assault in the aftermath of 9/11 have shown themselves to be
remarkably robust. They have not crumbled or been washed away.
They have their detractors, but in far larger numbers they have their
supporters.
In the United States, there remains much which is of serious
concern. But it is striking that the Bush Administration has not
succeeded in killing off Kyoto or the ICC, or rewriting the Geneva
Conventions or the Torture Convention, or building any sort of
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consensus to support its revised approach to the international rules
governing the use of force. Quite the contrary. There are signs that
the Bush Administration is rethinking its strategies and its policies.
Last month it reversed position and dropped its outright opposition to
the ICC, deciding not to veto a Security Council resolution referring
the situation in Darfur to the ICC. And privately, a number of senior
Administration officials have recognized that the Administration may
have made serious mistakes in its so-called "war on terrorism" and in
respect of Guantanamo, and that a more consensual and rules-based
approach is needed if necessary cooperation from other states is going
to be engaged.
So against this background, it seems to me that the spirit of the
Atlantic Charter still abounds, that Britain and the United States are
bound to re-engage with their commitment to a rules-based system,
that international law is alive and kicking, and that the world is not
quite as lawless as some may wish. And although it may not be the
only question to ask, the election showed that the question - is it legal
under international law? - resonates for a great number of people in
this country.
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